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Abstract
This paper focuses on New Labour’s policy 
towards the nuclear renaissance. It places this policy 
in the context of wider discussions on the democratic 
implications of the new constellations of governance 
emerging from the drive towards more sustainable 
futures. The paper identifies two crucial developments 
within the nuclear renaissance: firstly,  the contro-
versy surrounding the consultative process in 2006 
and 2007; and secondly, the creation of new ‘efficient’ 
and ‘streamlined’ planning procedures through the 
establishment of the Planning Act 2008 and The 
Infrastructure and Planning Commission (IPC). The 
article builds on work which seeks to bring together 
questions of ‘democracy’ and ‘the political’ within 
discussions on ‘sustainability’. It argues that an under-
standing of these moments can only be properly 
established through an analysis of the wider discur-
sive frame of ‘sustainability’ in which nuclear has 
been reinvented, and the way it has been utilized as a 
strategic tool of governing. The apparent ‘consensus’ 
on sustainability appears to foreclose discussions on 
multiple and divergent political imaginaries into 
a single shared vision. This is symptomatic of the 
wider conditions of the post-political and the post-
democratic, where debate is reduced to managerial 
and technocratic particularities in which, regardless 
of public engagement, nuclear power becomes an 
‘inevitability’.
Key Words: Consultation, democracy, planning, nuclear 
renaissance, sustainability
El renacimiento de la energía nuclear en el 
Reino Unido: deficiencias democráticas dentro del 
“consenso” sobre la sustentabilidad
Resumen
Este artículo se centra en la política del Nuevo 
Laborismo en torno al renacimiento nuclear. Se ubica 
a esta política en el contexto de discusiones más 
amplias acerca de las implicaciones democráticas de 
nuevas constelaciones de governanza que emergen 
de la tendencia hacia futuros más sustentables. El 
artículo identifica dos desarrollos clave dentro del 
renacimiento nuclear: en primer lugar, la controversia 
en torno al proceso de consulta de 2006 y 2007, y en 
segundo lugar, la creación de nuevos procedimientos 
de planeamiento “eficientes” y “racionales” a través del 
establecimiento de la Ley de Planeamiento de 2008 
y de la Comisión de Infraestructura y Planeamiento 
(IPC en inglés). El artículo se basa en trabajos que 
apuntan a incorporar cuestiones sobre “democracia” y 
sobre “lo político” en las discusiones sobre “sustenta-
bilidad”. Se argumenta que sólo se puede arribar 




a un entendimiento adecuado de estas cuestiones si 
se analiza el marco general de las discusiones sobre 
“sustentabilidad” dentro del cual lo nuclear se ha 
reinventado, así como también la manera en que el 
mismo se ha utilizado como herramienta de gobierno. 
El aparente “consenso” sobre la sustentabilidad parece 
limitar las discusiones que se dan entre múltiples y 
divergentes imaginarios políticos dentro de una visión 
singular y consensuada. Ello es un síntoma de las 
condiciones más generales de lo “post-político” y lo 
“post-democrático”, donde el debate es reducido a las 
particularidades gerenciales y tecnocráticas dentro de 
las cuales el poder nuclear se convierte en “inevitable”, 
sin considerar la participación pública.
Palabras clave: consulta pública, democracia, 
planeamiento, renacimiento nuclear, sustentabilidad
Introduction
“…Consent is not to be understood as 
the sociologist’s ‘spontaneous consensus’...but 
rather as something that is organized through 
specific institutions and always (and necessarily) 
backed up by the potential application of force”. 
(Burawoy, 2003: 215)
“We can expect simmering frustration, 
resentment, widespread feelings of disempower-
ment and in consequence possibly more direct 
action and divorcement from the political 
process”. Journalist John Vidal, commenting 
on the democratic implications of the 2008 
Planning Act (2009a).
Research into the governance of nuclear power 
development in the UK is timely. In late 2009, Ed 
Miliband (Labour Party Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change) announced plans for 10 nuclear 
power stations to be a built in a decade -- the most 
ambitious proposed nuclear development in Europe 
(Vaughan, 2009). This ambitious project is justified as 
a response to climatic change, and the need to ‘keep 
the lights on’ through the utilization of low carbon 
energy sources. Yet there is widespread public distrust 
of nuclear power. No nuclear power station has been 
ordered in Britain since the construction of Sizewell B 
in 1985. The nuclear option had largely been ruled out 
as too costly and troublesome, due to issues associated 
with nuclear waste production, and other social and 
economic burdens of its legacy. 
In 2003 the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) said that nuclear power could be a 
suitable low carbon technology. However, due to the 
economic inefficiencies and waste legacy surrounding 
the nuclear industry, new power stations would not be 
built, although “we will keep the option open” (DTI, 
2003: 48). By 2008 this option was, indeed, opened, 
twinned with the intention to reduce man-made 
carbon emissions by 60% by 2050. The Department 
for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(BERR) declared that “we have decided...to build and 
operate new nuclear power stations” (BERR, 2008a: 
4).
So the decision was made. However the consulta-
tive and planning phases of nuclear policy were 
controversial.  The government, committed to “the 
fullest consultation”, was forced to repeat earlier 
(2006) consultations, which had occurred  after 
Greenpeace launched a successful legal challenge. 
Widespread discontent emerged during this second 
series of consultations. The process was labelled as 
merely a ‘rubber stamping’ exercise to legitimize a 
decision already taken. Moderate NGOs, such as The 
Green Alliance and WWF, as well as members of the 
public, abandoned the proceedings, calling them a 
‘sham’ (Vidal, 2009b; Macalister, 2009). 
The new planning strategies outlined in the 
Planning Act of 2008, designed to oversee the develop-
ment of proposed nuclear power, have been criticized 
for being undemocratic: “a long drawn out battle with 
the planning system” has been anticipated by the 
media (Hetherington, 2009). Elsewhere, the ‘Nuclear 
Renaissance’ has begun to receive critical attention. 
Significant attention has been directed at the many 
controversial aspects of new nuclear development. 
These include (but are not limited to) the implica-
tions of nuclear for the development of a decentralized 
energy system (Mitchell and Woodman, 2006), the 
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economics of nuclear power (see Thomas et al, 2007), 
and issues surrounding nuclear and the discourse of 
trust (see Wulforst, 2007). Discussions of the many 
risks and dangers can be found, for example, in 
Nuclear or not? (Elliot 2007), which provides an excel-
lent overview of the issues. Hence, these arguments 
will not be rehearsed here.
Instead, this article interrogates the democratic 
and political implications of nuclear power’s renais-
sance. The ‘nuclear renaissance’ is the term utilized 
within government, industry, and the media, to refer 
to the revival that nuclear technology is apparently 
experiencing, within the context of new concerns 
about energy security and climate change. The article 
reviews the discursive framing of nuclear power as 
‘sustainable’, and then explores this rhetorical framing 
as a tool of governing, both within the consultation 
process, and in the justification of the controversial 
planning guidelines.  Both elements are brought 
together in a discussion of the nuclear renaissance 
within the wider context of the discourse of sustainable 
development. It is proposed that this rhetoric is symp-
tomatic of the post-political and the post-democratic, 
where debate and discussion is replaced by a manage-
rial and technocratic style of governing. Within such 
conditions, nuclear power exists as the technology, 
enabling the continuation of current socio-economic 
excesses in an apparently ‘sustainable’ manner.
The nuclear renaissance: ‘reluctant acceptance’ 
of nuclear power as a ‘sustainable’ technology
The nuclear industry must be seen in a wider set 
of relations referred to as ‘the nuclear doctrine’. This 
is defined as “a set of political, social and cultural 
conditions combining several factors, each of the 
factors in some way reveals a part to the story that 
has become our historical legacy and context, as well 
as actions of today and tomorrow related to nuclear 
power” (Wulforst, 2007: 2). A new era of optimism 
towards nuclear technology has emerged through 
its reinvention as ‘sustainable’. Nuclear technology 
has been framed in a new light, where the notion of 
‘framing’ connotes “the perceptual lenses, worldviews 
or underlying assumptions that guide communal 
interpretations and definitions of particular issues” 
(Miller, 2000: 212).
Recently, as Bickerstaff et al (2008: 147) observe, 
“...the expansion of the new nuclear power sector is 
increasingly being constructed by individual actors, 
scientists, a range of senior politicians and advisors 
to government within a prognostic policy frame – 
in other words it is being reframed as a solution to 
the problem of climate change”. What must also be 
added is that powerful lobbying by the nuclear power 
industry has been vital in establishing nuclear’s new 
‘sustainable’ status. The nuclear industry journal 
Nucleonics stated in 1998 that “nuclear needs climate 
change, more than climate change needs nuclear” 
(Quoted in Elliot, 2007: 4). Importantly, the discur-
sive creation of ‘sustainable nuclear power’ has focused 
on it being zero carbon at the point of production, 
whilst identifying the notable issue of waste as a sepa-
rate element of consideration. This has been noted by 
members of the Committee on Radioactive Waste 
management (CoRWM) (see Lowry, 2007).
Nuclear was previously one of the great enemies of 
the environmental movement. However it has begun 
to evolve as a ‘solution’ due to its low carbon status. 
It has continued to gain ground amidst mounting 
evidence of global warming produced from the IPCC 
and the need to mitigate against 2˚C warming. James 
Lovelock,  author of the Gaia hypothesis, supports the 
pro-nuclear cause, arguing that “we have no time to 
experiment with visionary energy sources: civilization 
is in imminent danger and has to use nuclear – the one 
safe, available energy source – now, or suffer the pain 
soon to be inflicted on our outraged planet” (2005). 
This changing attitude can be seen in the writings 
of environmentalist George Monbiot, who had once 
declared that nuclear was “the world’s most dangerous 
business” and that “…it is time to shut nuclear power 
down, and begin the dangerous and expensive task of 
decommissioning one of Britain’s biggest disasters” 
(2000). By August 2008 however, his view had radi-
cally shifted: “I have now reached the point at which 
I no longer care whether or not the answer is nuclear. 
Let it happen” adding that “…we can no longer afford 
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any rigid principle but one: that the harm done to 
people living now and in the future must be mini-
mized by the most effective means, whatever they 
might be” (Monbiot, 2008). 
Lovelock’s alarmist call, that ‘civilization is in 
imminent danger’, resembles the apocalyptic imagery 
in which the climate change issue is often situated. As 
Swyngedouw argues, the rhetoric surrounding climate 
change increasingly “…invokes the spectre of annihi-
lating apocalyptic futures if no direct and immediate 
action is taken” (2007: 33). Within such framing we 
see a grudging acceptance of nuclear, where its ethical 
concerns and dangers are dwarfed, because “climate 
change is by far the biggest issue”. The reduction of 
carbon becomes what Monbiot refers to as ‘the one 
rigid principle’ within which all other concerns must 
be considered. This does not equate to a full endorse-
ment of nuclear power. Rather it connotes that the 
various substantial concerns of the dangers of the 
nuclear industry, can only be understood within a 
wider context of the ‘threat to civilization’ posed by 
climate change. Here we see the linguistic construc-
tion of a ‘trade-off’ scenario, where, as undesirable as 
nuclear may be, it must be grudgingly accepted with 
regards to climatic change.
Traditionally public perceptions have highlighted 
widespread concern over new nuclear construction 
and a deep distrust of the industry itself. However, 
these views appear to be shifting (see Grove-White 
et al, 2006 and Pidgeon et al 2008). The change in 
public opinion however, cannot be understood apart 
from the new and increasingly prevalent rhetoric of 
nuclear power as a sustainable technology. Bickerstaff 
et al illustrate the apparent ‘reluctant acceptance’ of 
new nuclear development and a shift in public opinion 
associated with a “…new framing of nuclear energy 
as ‘sustainable energy’” (2008: 146). The discourse 
of ‘reluctant acceptance’ defined as “…a resignation 
verging on frustration that there is no avoiding some 
continued dependence on the nuclear sector” (ibid: 
159), has become an increasingly common response 
to the ‘spectre’ of climate change; where “beginning 
from individual and group positions on nuclear power 
that, as we have documented, were resolutely negative, 
there were observable shifts towards more mixed and 
open views about this issue when participants consid-
ered climate change” (ibid: 159).
The term ‘sustainability’, through which nuclear 
has recently been reframed within government policy, 
is therefore significant in the comprehension of the 
new-found enthusiasm for the nuclear option. It has 
become the ‘buzzword’ of our current era; a signi-
fier which can seemingly be attached to everything 
and everyone, regardless of political persuasion. Such 
apparent agreement renders ‘sustainability’ an a-polit-
ical domain, where discussions surrounding the term 
are usually confined to the realm of scientific exper-
tise and other forms of expert administration. As 
Žižek argues however “…every neutralization of some 
partial content as ‘non-political’ is a political gesture 
par excellance” (1999: 227).
The definition of sustainability presented in the 
policy documents of the UK government, is both 
vague in its detail, and all encompassing in terms of 
the diversity of issues it invokes. However, certain 
features within the sustainable discourse remain 
uncontested, and their naturalization assumed. This 
vision is based upon technological innovation and 
the laws of the market as solutions to environmental 
‘externalities’, rather than fundamental changes in 
consumptive practices being needed, or questioning 
the underlying productive process of current societal 
organization. Tony Blair made this perfectly clear at 
Davos in 2005, when he stated that “if we were to 
put forward as a solution to climate change something 
which would involve cuts in economic growth or 
standards of living, it would not matter how justified 
it was, it simply would not be agreed to” (BBC News, 
2005). In the language of ‘Ecological Modernization’, 
nuclear power represents a ‘win-win’ scenario where 
‘business as usual’ can continue, powered by an 
apparently ‘carbon neutral’ technology. “The return 
of nuclear”, argue Bludhom and Welsh (2007: 192) 
“…illustrates the firm resolve to defend and continue 
rather than reverse or change the established path”. 
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The presentation of the sustainable vision is one 
where consensus has been reached on the appropriate 
course of action to take. Indeed, the consensual form 
of politics which sustainable development arguably 
entails has become the main political arrangement of 
late capitalist democracies (Badiou, 2005; Ranciére, 
1995). Such a condition in which there appears to be 
a consensual vision of sustainability, has significant 
implications for the features of decision making and 
deliberation which can occur.
A significant body of work on environmental 
politics has emerged around the idea of such a consen-
sual political arrangement where shared ‘win-win’ 
outcomes have become the order of the day (Durant et 
al, 2004). However, others have become wary of such 
a frame, arguing that “…the existence of consensus 
can be a sign of personal or structural power which 
is exercised to keep various voices and conflicts out of 
the realm of public discussion” (O’Neill, 2007: 183). 
The consensual form of politics has been identified 
as one that “…mobilizes a view of politics which has 
evacuated the dimension of antagonism and, postu-
lates the existence of a ‘general interest of the people’ 
whose implementation overcomes the winners/losers 
form of resolution of conflicts” (Mouffe, 2000: 14).
A consensual arrangement is never ‘spontaneous’ 
and ‘natural’ but rather must be forged and main-
tained, drawing critical attention to the “dispositions, 
manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, [and] function-
ings” (Foucault,1977: 26) enacted within governing 
institutions to preserve the consensual vision on 
sustainability. Particular attention must therefore be 
given to how the rhetorical framing of nuclear power 
as a sustainable technology, exists as a strategic tool 
of governing, in influencing opinion and forging the 
terms of debate. 
The consultation period
“Before any decision to proceed with the 
building of new nuclear power stations, there 
will need to be the fullest public consultation” 
(DTI, 2003)
“The presentation of a decision as a discrete 
event can itself be an institutional artefact, a 
retrospective formal ratification of decisions 
already taken” (O’Neill et al, 2008: 207)
In the Energy Review (2003) the British govern-
ment committed itself to carrying out “the fullest 
consultation” on the nuclear issue. The need for such 
a consultation was noted by prominent voices such 
as the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC, 
2006).  However in the initial energy consultation of 
2006, controversy surrounded the framing of question 
3, which focussed on nuclear directly. It asked,  “The 
Energy White paper left open the option of nuclear 
new build – Are there particular considerations that 
should apply to nuclear as the government re-examines 
the issues bearing on new build, including long-term 
liabilities and waste management?” (DTI, 2006a: 11).
The rhetorical framing of this significant ques-
tion cast doubt as to the extent that the process was 
in fact ‘open ended’. This relates to the differentiation 
between substantial questions, related to the prin-
ciple of the idea, which would take on the question 
of nuclear directly in relation to alternative strategies, 
in comparison to issues- related questions, which in 
this case would examine the necessary particularities 
of governmental consideration of nuclear power. The 
framing of the question, clearly takes the form of the 
latter, focussing on the details and particularities of 
new nuclear development, rather than confronting 
the underlying question of the nuclear option in the 
first place (Royal Courts of Justice, 2007: 45). A truly 
‘open ended’ questioning, living up to ‘the fullest 
public consultation’, as proposed by the Sustainable 
Development Commission, would look at and address 
substantive concerns, rather than bypassing this stage 
to focus on the particularities of nuclear.
Despite this, it was announced that “the govern-
ment believes that nuclear has a role to play in future 
UK generating mix” (DTI, 2006b: 114).  However, 
the consultation period and the rapidity of deci-
sion-making received a notable critique from The 
Environmental Audit Committee (2006), arguing that 
the consultation period had largely been designed to 
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facilitate a decision already taken by the government. 
Greenpeace launched, and won, a legal case where 
it was declared that the consultation process had in 
fact been “seriously flawed”, “wholly inadequate” 
and “unlawful” (Royal Courts of Justice, 2007: 45). 
Furthermore, the haste with which a decision was 
made suggests that the views of those consulted (which 
were largely negative, see DTI, 2006c), appeared to be 
of little importance.
A day after Greenpeace’s victory, despite Tony Blair 
boldly announcing that “this won’t affect policy at all” 
(BBC News, 2007) the government were obliged to 
provide further consultation. The second phase began 
with the release of the consultation document The 
Future of Nuclear Power: the role of nuclear power in a 
low carbon economy (DTI, 2007a), published alongside 
an Energy White Paper Meeting the Energy Challenge 
(DTI, 2007b). Of particular significance in these 
consultation documents, was the increased level of 
rhetorical entwining of the question of nuclear, where 
it was related specifically to the wider frame of climate 
strategy and sustainability.
Question 16 posed the main point of controversy, 
asking: “In the context of tackling climate change and 
ensuring energy security, do you agree or disagree that 
it would be in the public-interest to give energy compa-
nies the option of investing in new nuclear stations?” 
(DTI, 2007a: 29). The wording here is crucial, and 
encapsulates the notion that  the ‘public good’ of 
nuclear power, and all associated concerns about the 
potential ‘risks’ and ‘unknowns’, can be apprehended 
and addressed only within wider concerns and discus-
sion of climate change.
Such an increase in the rhetorical framing of 
nuclear can also be seen in the discrepancies between 
the aims identified on the consultation website and 
within the main documents, and the ways in which 
the questions were actually framed in the latter parts 
of the consultation document and the stakeholder 
materials distributed at events. The website stated that 
“the discussion at events will address the same key 
questions in the consultation document” (UK Gov 
quoted in Greenpeace, 2007). At the beginning of 
the consultation document it was stated that the aims 
were to “provide the government with information 
which will help it to take the decision whether or not 
to allow energy companies to build new nuclear power 
stations in the country” (DTI, 2007a: 3), and “to ask 
whether it is in the public interest to allow energy 
companies to invest in new nuclear power stations” 
(ibid: 3). There exists a clear difference between the 
questions encapsulated in these aims, and the framing 
of the question 16 cited above.
As Dorfman notes “Even in the most technical 
and sophisticated forms of analysis it seems that the 
answer you get depends on the way you frame the 
question” (2008: 6). Of particular note, is the way 
in which the ethical issues of nuclear power, particu-
larly that of waste disposal, were twinned with ethical 
issues of intergenerational concern in relation to the 
dangers of climatic change. The official line taken 
by the government is clear:“we believe that the inter-
generational issues of radioactive waste should not be 
considered in isolation, but alongside the long-term 
impact of climate change” (DTI, 2007a: 144).
The rhetorical impact of such a statement should 
not be underestimated. Despite evidence of other 
potential energy paths, the rhetorical device portrays 
that a trade off will have to be made, in terms of the 
public suffering the potential dangers and uncer-
tainties of a nuclear waste legacy in order to protect 
‘civilization’ from the devastating effects of climate 
change. As Blowers argues “by suggesting that 
nuclear new build should be discussed in terms of 
the need to address climate change the government 
is framing the discussions in a particular way. That 
is, one that is likely to privilege the case for nuclear 
energy” (2008: 32). Greenpeace launched a complaint 
to the Marketing Research Standards Board, who 
concluded that ““information was inaccurately or 
misleadingly presented, or was imbalanced, which 
gave rise to a material risk of respondents being led 
towards a particular answer” (Greenpeace, 2008).  It 
appears that in response to negative public opinion in 
the first consultation, the process was simply repeated 
with an increased rhetorical entwining of nuclear with 
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climate change in an attempt to influence an outcome 
of ‘reluctant acceptance’ towards the nuclear option.
Planning for a sustainable (and nuclear) future
Significant developments in the planning system 
deemed necessary for facilitating the building of new 
nuclear power, have also been discursively framed 
through recourse to ‘sustainability’. Since 2006, the 
government stressed that, in order to implement large 
infrastructure developments for a more sustainable 
future, reforms in the planning system were neces-
sary for the provision of a more secure and certain 
environment for investment (DTI, 2006d). Since 
then, significant changes had been mobilised with 
the release of The Planning Act 2008 where large 
scale infrastructure projects will be overseen from the 
perspective of ‘national need’. 
The past decade has been dominated by the 
proposed notions of ‘horizontal’ governance and a 
‘de-centred’ state apparatus, where there is no longer a 
mono-centric state, but rather the state exists as ‘many 
centres’ within self organizing, inter-organizational 
networks (Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes 1997; Durant et al, 
2004). Previously, the government professed a desire 
for ‘decentralized’ forms of decision making; where 
“as different parts of the UK, our ability to set our 
own priorities and find our own answers is an impor-
tant part of achieving sustainability” (DEFRA, 2005). 
However, what is emerging within the development of 
The Planning Act appears to be a practical and rhetor-
ical diminishment of such principles in favour of more 
overtly authoritarian forms of decision making.
Proposed new nuclear development has undoubt-
edly been a major influence on the new developments 
in planning. In 2005, before the desire for new 
nuclear build had been explicitly stated by the UK 
Government, Keith Parker, who at the time headed 
the Nuclear Industry Association, said that a new 
nuclear build would require “creating the environ-
ment in which the private sector investors would feel 
comfortable” (Quoted in Meek, 2005). This feeling 
of ‘comfort’ is predicated on a series of demands, 
including: “the government to change the rules so 
that planning permission for nuclear power stations 
can be granted more quickly”; “government money for 
inspectors to certify new reactor designs in Britain”; 
“the government to guarantee a minimum price for 
nuclear electricity to prevent it being rendered unprof-
itable if other ways of generating power turned out to 
be cheaper”; and “the need to be able to build a large 
number of reactors (identical) 10 in theory, to lower 
costs through economies of scale” (ibid). Above all, 
this identifies the need for a strategic alliance between 
government and industry, to safeguard the develop-
ment of new nuclear build from interventions of both 
public protest and the (normally privileged) ‘laws of 
the market’.
 Plans for such a ‘streamlined’ system desired by 
the nuclear industry were outlined in the government 
document Planning for a Sustainable Future (2007). 
The document states that a more efficient and sustain-
able planning system is predicated on three factors; 
national policy statements for major infrastructure 
development, a presumption ‘in favour’ of develop-
ment for major infrastructure proposals so long as they 
are consistent with national policy statements, and an 
independent commission to manage inquiries and 
determine individual applications (HM Gov, 2007: 
20). The discursive transition is notably a much more 
state oriented one, with the ‘scaling up’ of a sustain-
able energy strategy to the national level.
  In the white paper, Meeting the Energy Challenge, 
the connections between nuclear power, and the new 
national planning laws were explicitly stated. The 
paper outlines that “the government will carry out 
a package of facilitative actions designed to reduce 
the regulatory and planning risk associated with 
investing in nuclear power stations” (BERR, 2008b: 
129).  Consultation will be undertaken through 
Strategic Siting Assessments (SSAs), where consent for 
the development would have already been granted at 
the national level. Time limits placed by government 
ensure an efficient procedure for the development of 
nuclear, with the anticipation that development of 




The Planning Act (HMGov, 2008) put these 
changes into law. Again the language of ‘sustainability’ 
would be crucial in justifying these alterations. Due to 
the perceived ‘urgency’ in combating climate change, 
National Policy Statements (NPS’s), and potential 
negative features of the act, (such as the changing 
nature of consultation) are justified as being vital in 
achieving sustainable development. National Policy 
Statements are thought necessary to limit discussion 
and to facilitate timely action, because “consideration 
of individual applications can take months or years 
including lengthy debate about the national need 
for infrastructure. The process of reaching decisions 
is complicated” (Department for Communities and 
Local Government. 2009: 4). 
 The Infrastructure and Planning Commission 
(IPC), which was a point of particular controversy 
within the planning act, represented an authori-
tarian turn in the Labour government’s sustainable 
development policy. Under the IPC, questions were 
to be based largely on written responses, or were to 
be led by commissioners as a question and answer 
session, avoiding ‘adversarial’ debate. The commis-
sioners leading the IPC, were made up of 35 experts 
drawn from “planning, law, engineering, national 
and local government, environment, economy and 
business”, to decide on major projects, construct 
national strategies and act as intermediaries between 
industry and the public. The IPC outline report stated 
that “commissioners will act as decision makers on 
applications for nationally significant infrastructure 
projects” (Department for Communities and Local 
Government. 2009: 5)
Within discussions on nuclear and the plan-
ning procedures surrounding its development, the 
hegemonic encapsulation of sustainability acts as the 
governing force of governance itself. With the case 
of neoliberalism for example, there is a seemingly 
paradoxical link between a market driven, ‘state-
free’, business oriented ideological framework, and 
the development of an often more autocratic role of 
the state, where “…neo-liberalism might be charac-
terized as the dominant contemporary rationality of 
government” (Dean, 1999: 150).  That is, the very 
ideology which posits itself as being ‘anti state’, creates 
a more unaccountable state formation. Here, policy 
is largely determined by a collaboration of expert 
administration between government and business 
interests. ‘Sustainability’ (which ultimately includes 
the assumptions of neoliberalism), functions similarly, 
where it operates as a ‘dominant rationality’ guiding 
government policy. This limits and forecloses discus-
sion whilst simultaneously creating and justifying 
more autocratic forms of governance, where decisions 
are formed through a union of unaccountable elites 
and expert administration. 
The nuclear renaissance as ‘post-political’ and 
‘post democratic’
The origins of both the inevitability of nuclear as 
a ‘solution’ to climate change, and the controversies 
surrounding the governance of the issue, are to be 
found in an analysis of the discursive frame of ‘sustain-
able development’ as symptomatic of the conditions of 
the ‘post-political’ and the ‘post-democratic’. Although 
the environmental question surrounding the need for 
sustainable development has increasingly become a 
central object of ‘politics’, Swyngedouw (2007) iden-
tifies the ‘politics’ surrounding the environment (in 
particular the case of climate change) as being funda-
mentally that of the ‘post-political’. 
Such a ‘post-political’ condition has been identi-
fied by Žižek (1999), Ranciére (2004), and Mouffe 
(2000) (among others), as that where disagreement 
and the antagonistic element central to the properly 
political, is replaced by a consensual, managerial form 
of governing, where discussion is limited to a series of 
single issues and challenges common to all. The post-
political functions firmly within the realms of what is 
considered possible within our current political assem-
blages. The properly political gesture however, alters 
the very coordinates of what is considered possible. 
The political functions through the possibility of the 
impossible; of political imaginaries reaching beyond 
current societal configurations. As Alain Badiou writes 
“the essence of politics is not the plurality of opinions. 
It is the prescription of a possibility in rupture with 
what exists” (2005: 24).
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Vital in understanding the post-political is consid-
eration of the discursive frames in which hegemonic 
constructs which eradicate proper debate become 
solidified. The establishment of the post-political situ-
ation relies on a disguised political act, in which the 
‘solutions’ to the challenges experienced are assumed 
through a hegemonic grip on those signifiers rendered 
as being a-political. According to Ranciére, the prop-
erly political “…is not a quarrel over which solution 
to apply to a situation but a dispute over the situa-
tion itself, a dispute over what is visible as an element 
of a situation, over which visible elements belong 
to what is common, over the capacity of subjects to 
designate this common and argue for it” (2004: 6). 
‘Empty signifiers’ are the vital battleground for the 
consolidation of hegemonic visions. As Žižek states, 
“the struggle for ideologico-political hegemony is thus 
always the struggle for appropriation of the terms that 
are ‘spontaneously’ experienced as apolitical, as tran-
scending political boundaries” (1999: 208). 
Discussions on the political relate to discussions 
on the democratic, where the anti-democratic project 
is always that which seeks to de-politicize and main-
tain the functioning of politics in its ‘normal’ state 
(ibid.), as opposed to a properly democratic interven-
tion of an ‘active’ politics of positive citizenship, where 
groups and organizations develop collective identities, 
and formulate demands based on such identities. 
Crouch (2004: 4) identifies the condition of ‘post-
democracy’ where “the mass of citizens plays a passive, 
acquiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to 
the signals given to them behind the spectacle of the 
electoral game, politics is really shaped in private by 
an interaction between elected governments and elites 
that overwhelmingly represent business interests”. 
It is the containment of discussion on sustainability 
on those solutions which are ‘possible’ which evacu-
ates the occurrence of truly political gestures within 
the environmental debate. Within the discursive arena 
of the current framing of ‘sustainable development’, 
political imaginaries and questions focussed on the 
qualitative features of the world in which we wish to 
inhabit, and the social, environmental and economic 
relations we seek to maintain or abandon, is replaced 
by a ‘consensus’ around the ‘solutions’ to environ-
mental problems, which ultimately cannot challenge 
the underlying ‘accepted’ features of the neoliberal 
vision of sustainable development. In that sense there 
is a certain degree of neoliberal inevitability in terms 
of the nuclear option, because it is a ‘technological 
megafix’ which can enable the continuation of the 
excesses of late capitalism, in an apparently ‘green’ 
fashion (Porrit, quoted in Vidal, 2008). Those politi-
cians who argue that there is ‘no option’ but to go 
nuclear are on one level correct, if viewed from the 
perspective of those ‘solutions’ which are part of the 
‘art of the possible’. 
Within discourses of ‘sustainability’, which direct 
both the consultation process on nuclear power, and 
the justification for more ‘streamlined’ planning 
procedures, the portrayal of unquestionable ‘common 
conditions’ are key to framing the terms of the discus-
sion. The two ‘common conditions’ encapsulated in 
the government’s vision of sustainability in the white 
paper Planning for a Sustainable Future, if we recall, 
are ‘climate change’ and ‘globalization’. The ways in 
which the two common conditions are rhetorically 
deployed within sustainable policy are notably similar 
however. What they share is being posited and repre-
sented as ‘external’, as objective realities and common 
conditions of ‘civilization’ which must be adapted to 
in an increasingly rapid manner, to avoid disaster. 
Both ‘external’ elements which inform the sustain-
able vision function similarly. On the one hand, a 
range of complex and partial economic processes 
are bundled together within the singular spectre of 
‘globalization’, and the complexities of climatic change 
are represented and portrayed as the ‘inconvenient’ 
presence of CO2 and little else. Crucially, although 
part of the same challenge of sustainable development, 
an actual link between the two is not established, in 
the sense that there is no suggestion that the accumu-
lation of carbon in the atmosphere is inherently linked 
to the ‘economic reality’ of globalization. 
Such a framing represents what Swyngedouw 
refers to as a “homogenizing mantle of populist 
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environmental discourse” which “…combines apoca-
lyptic visions with a hegemonic neoliberal view of 
social ordering” (2007: 36). The attitudinal approach 
towards the CO2 question thus has a certain affinity 
with populist politics (ibid.). Fundamentally, populism 
formulates the idea of a threat to the category of ‘the 
people’ rather than various competing political catego-
ries. “The people” Žižek argues “…enters as a political 
subject, and all different and particular struggles and 
antagonisms appear as parts of a global antagonistic 
struggle between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (2006: 553).  Such 
a political constellation, focussing on the mitigation 
and adaption to various external threats, according to 
Žižek,“…remains a version of the politics of fear – it 
mobilizes the crowd by way of invoking the fear of the 
corrupt intruder” (2008: 302). The idea of ‘reluctant 
acceptance’ of the nuclear option when it is framed 
with climate change clearly relates to such a politics 
of fear, which forces the acceptance of a suspension 
of discussion or certain legitimate claims because of 
the fear of an imminent disaster if no action is taken 
immediately.
The managerial style surrounding ‘sustainability’, 
reflects the wider trends of the ‘post-democratic’ 
where the role of government and politics in general, 
becomes the strategic alliance of an elite mix of 
business and government to administer the various 
identified ‘common conditions’ affecting society. Such 
a managerial form is an example of a political condi-
tion where, as Ranciére (2004: 7) writes, “consensus, 
is actually the modern form of reducing politics to the 
police”. Such a consensual arrangement, sees a form 
of policy making “…in which the stakeholders (i.e. 
those with recognized speech) are known in advance 
and where disruption or dissent is reduced to debates 
over the institutional modalities of governing, the 
accountancy calculus of risk, and the technologies of 
expert administration or management” (Swyngedouw, 
2009: 609). Developments such as National Policy 
Statements and the IPC outlined in The Planning Act 
(2008) represent such managerial tendencies justified 
through a ‘consensus’ on the ‘solutions’ for combating 
climate change, of which nuclear is one.
Within the consultation process on nuclear and 
the ‘participatory’ element of the planning procedures, 
it would seem that the decisive moment has already 
occurred. The consultative procedures are merely a 
method of justifying the inevitability of the business 
and growth oriented style of politics experienced in 
recent times. Within such a post-democratic climate, a 
negative activism of blame and complaint is the order 
of the day, where the main driving force of action is 
to hold politicians to account. The foreclosed decision 
on the nuclear option, it is said, leaves NGO groups 
the choice between a legal challenge and direct action 
(Ellis, 2008). One can only answer a question which 
has been asked: unfortunately, questioning how to 
alter and transform socio-environmental relations into 
fundamentally more egalitarian and ecologically just 
ones is strictly prohibited. Under such prohibition, 
regardless of consultation, public opinion, and poten-
tial risks, nuclear power appears to be an ‘inevitable’ 
choice.
At the time of writing, the 2010 UK general 
election has produced a coalition between the conserv-
atives and the liberal democrats. The conservative 
government originally positioned themselves against 
the IPC, and the Liberal Democrats were sceptical 
about the nuclear option. It is yet to be seen exactly 
how the ‘nuclear renaissance’ will be affected. It is 
likely however, that given the requirements of nuclear 
development for strong state support and reduction of 
public consultation, the authoritarian gestures demon-
strated between 2006 and 2010 in the new labour era 
are set to continue, albeit in a rebranded form. The 
tactical manoeuvrings of the consultation period, and 
the developments of The Planning Act (2008), point 
towards the emergent trend of a vision of ‘sustain-
ability’, which excludes alternative trajectories and 
limits democratic engagement. There is little evidence 
to suggest that ‘sustainable’ nuclear power can be 
developed in any other way, regardless of a change in 
government.
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Conclusion
Slavoj Žižek writes in relation to the ‘third way’ 
consensual politics emergent in the past decade that 
“…advocates of New Labour like to emphasize that 
one should take good ideas without any prejudice and 
apply them, whatever their (ideological) origins. And 
what are these ‘good ideas’? The answer is of course, 
ideas that work” (1999: 236) Nuclear power appears 
to be such an ‘idea that works’ within the consensual 
vision of sustainable development, where evidence 
suggests that the decision had largely already been 
taken, and ‘the fullest consultation’ was a limiting 
exercise to justify such a decision. The rhetorical 
framing of nuclear, justifies new planning proce-
dures to offer greater ‘comfort’ to nuclear investors 
by eradicating the democratic input of the public, all 
in the name of the non-negotiable, all-encompassing 
vision of sustainable development. Both developments 
appear as crucial ‘techniques and functionings’ where 
politics proper in its active and antagonistic form is 
replaced by the maintenance of a ‘sustainable vision’, 
where democracy and politics remain on the back-foot 
due to the imminence of the ‘common conditions’ of 
climate change and the global economic reality.
The lenses of the democratic and the political, 
open up the opportunity for a fundamentally more 
radical appraisal of environmental politics, which is 
not based on teasing out how democracy and politics 
can look like within our ‘current condition’, but rather 
how our current condition should be viewed from 
the perspective of the democratic and the political. 
This fundamental shift of analysis radically reasserts 
a political imaginary into the de-politicized sphere of 
sustainable development. Thinking more positively 
about the discontent experienced during the nuclear 
renaissance, the potential radicalization of moderate 
NGOs (see Ellis, 2008) at least could make visible that 
which a consensual vision seeks to hide. These ‘side 
effects’ experienced during the policy of the nuclear 
renaissance reveal the tension between the hegem-
onic encapsulation of sustainable development and 
notions of democracy. The appearance of such side 
effects then raises another critical question: whether 
the ‘consensus’ on sustainability is also a sustainable 
consensus.
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